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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1974 
___________ 
 
XUE LIN ZHENG; MIN WU, 
            Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                               Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A99 607 643, A99 607 644) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2011 
Before:  SMITH, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 9, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Ming Wu and Xue Lin Zheng, husband and wife, petition for review of an order of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying a motion to reopen their immigration 
proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Wu and Zheng are natives and citizens of China.  Wu entered the United States 
without inspection in 1999.  In 2001, Zheng entered without inspection.  They married 
after their arrival.  In 2006, notices to appear were issued charging that Wu and Zheng are 
subject to removal from the United States for being present without having been admitted 
or paroled.  Wu and Zheng conceded that they are removable as charged and applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  Zheng 
was the primary applicant, claiming a fear of persecution based on China’s family 
planning policies.  Zheng and Wu had one child and Zheng was pregnant at the time of 
her immigration hearing.  She believed she would be sterilized if removed to China.  She 
also believed she would be penalized because she was smuggled out of China.   
Finding no objective evidence supporting Zheng’s fear of persecution, the 
Immigration Judge denied the applications for relief from removal.  The BIA dismissed 
Zheng and Wu’s appeal on April 2, 2008.  We dismissed their petition for review for lack 
of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed.  After one unsuccessful attempt to have the 
BIA reissue its decision for purposes of filing a timely petition for review, the BIA found 
counsel had mishandled their first petition for review, exercised its sua sponte authority, 
and reissued its decision so that it was deemed entered on June 16, 2009.  We denied 
Zheng and Wu’s subsequent petition for review on the merits.  See C.A. No. 09-2936. 
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On June 1, 2010, Zheng and Wu filed a motion to reopen their proceedings.  Wu, 
who is Christian, claimed that he faces persecution if removed because he mailed church 
materials to a house church in his village in China.  He stated that local authorities raided 
the church, discovered the mailings, and issued a summons requiring him to report to the 
police.  Wu stated that local authorities detained and beat up his father when he failed to 
report.   
The BIA found the motion untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after 
the final administrative order was issued on June 16, 2009.  The BIA also concluded that 
Zheng and Wu had not shown that their motion satisfies the exception to the 90-day time 
limit based on changed circumstances arising in their country of nationality.  The BIA 
explained that the evidence did not show that conditions had worsened in China for 
members of unregistered Christian churches.  Rather, the repressive conditions that 
currently exist are a continuation of the same policy in effect at the time of Zheng and 
Wu’s hearing. 
Alternatively, the BIA concluded that affidavits and letters by Wu and his family 
and other individualized evidence was not persuasive evidence of changed circumstances 
in China.  The BIA found this evidence speculative and stated that it did not show that 
Wu would be persecuted.  Finally, the BIA stated that Zheng and Wu had not shown that 
an exceptional situation exists that would warrant sua sponte reopening of the 
proceedings.  This petition for review followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the BIA’s 
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decision denying a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and review its underlying 
factual findings for substantial evidence.  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  We will uphold the denial of a motion to reopen unless the decision is 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Id. 
 There is no question that Zheng and Wu’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 
90-day time limitation for filing such a motion.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring 
that such a motion be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
administrative decision was rendered).  As recognized by the BIA, the 90-day time 
limitation does not apply where an applicant seeks asylum based on changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality.  Id. § 1003.2(c)(3).  In order to have 
their motion considered, Zheng and Wu were required to present material evidence of 
changed country conditions that could not have been presented during their hearing 
before the IJ.  Id; Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313.   
Zheng and Wu dispute the BIA’s conclusion that they did not establish changed 
conditions in China since their 2006 hearing.  However, in their brief they have not cited 
to any evidence of record supporting their contention that country conditions have 
changed.  As noted in the BIA’s decision, the record reflects that religious-based arrests 
occurred in China prior to their initial hearing in 2006.  In his own affidavit, Wu states 
that local police raided his house church and arrested the members present in 1999.  In 
addition, the Government correctly states that the 2005 Department of State Report on 
China submitted in the initial proceedings reflects that officials sought to repress 
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unregistered religious groups and that, while authorities’ handling of unregistered house 
churches varied by region, leaders and members were subject to detention.  A.R. at 428, 
445-47.  Zheng and Wu have not shown that the record compels the conclusion that 
country conditions have changed or that the BIA’s decision to deny reopening on this 
basis is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.
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Zheng and Wu also challenge the BIA’s alternative conclusion that the affidavits, 
letters, and other individualized evidence they submitted are not persuasive evidence of 
changed circumstances in China.  We find it unnecessary to address these documents 
because they reflect an alleged change in Wu’s personal circumstances, which, absent 
changed country conditions, do not excuse an untimely motion to reopen.  See Liu v. 
Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a contrary conclusion, 
which did not subject an alien citing changed personal circumstances to show changed 
country conditions, would not honor Congress’s purpose to avoid abuse of the system).  
Wu’s circumstances have allegedly changed as a result of his actions in mailing religious 
materials from the United States to a house church in his home village, not as a result of 
changed country conditions in China.  
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
                                              
1
Although not mentioned by Zheng and Wu, we recognize that the record includes a 2008 
article from the Christian Telegraph noting that human rights groups had stated that “the 
incidence of repression of Christian underground house churches in China in 2007 was 
68.6% greater than in the year 2006.”  A.R. at 72.  We find this article, which does not 
identify the human rights groups and is unsupported by any other evidence, insufficient to 
compel the conclusion that country conditions have changed.    
